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In recent years, corporate governance scholarship has begun to focus on the most 
common distribution of public corporation ownership: outside of the United States and 
the United Kingdom, publicly owned corporations often have a controlling shareholder.1
The presence of a controlling shareholder is especially prevalent in developing countries.  
In Asia, for example, some two-thirds of public corporations have one, most of whom 
represent family ownership.2 The Law and Finance literature, exemplified by a series of 
articles by combinations of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shliefer, 
Robert Vishny and others, treats the prevalence of controlling shareholders as the result 
of bad law;3 more specifically, controlling shareholders are ubiquitous in countries that 
do not adequately protect minority shareholders from the extraction of private benefits of 
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2control by dominant shareholders.  The logic is straightforward.  Controlling shareholders 
will not part with control because that will expose them to exploitation by a new 
controlling shareholder who acquires a controlling position in the market. 
 The Law and Finance account of the distribution of ownership, while compelling 
as far as it goes, is at best partial.  I have argued elsewhere that the syllogism is too 
simple to explain all controlling shareholder systems because we find significant numbers 
of controlling shareholders in countries with good law.4 If jurisdictions that adequately 
protect minority shareholders have a significant number of companies with a controlling 
shareholder, something other than bad law is at work.  And while the link between 
shareholder protection and distribution of shareholdings remains persuasive with respect 
to countries with poor shareholder protection – minority shares change hands at a 
significant discount to controlling shares in such jurisdictions5 – it still leaves important 
parts of even this landscape unexplained.  It does not, for example, explain why in Asian 
countries controlling shareholders are likely to be families.  And it does not explain, 
given poor shareholder protection, why we observe minority shareholders at all.  Since 
the Law and Finance account does not posit the existence of observable limits on how 
much of a minority shareholder’s investment the controlling shareholder can extract, why 
is not the value of minority shares in such jurisdictions and, it follows, the number of 
minority shareholders, zero? 
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3In this article, I want to continue the effort to complicate the controlling 
shareholder taxonomy by looking at the impact of bad law in a very different sense than 
contemplated by the Law and Finance literature.  In particular, I want to address the 
effect on the distribution of shareholdings when a jurisdiction provides not only poor 
minority shareholder protection, but poor commercial law generally.  Put differently, the 
goal is to play out the implications for the distribution of shareholders when the focus in 
not on conditions in the capital market, where poor shareholder protection has figured so 
prominently, but on conditions in the product market, where the driving legal influence is 
the quality of commercial law that supports the corporation’s actual business activities.  
Can bad commercial law help explain shareholder distribution? 
 In an important sense, the Law and Finance literature’s sharp focus on minority 
shareholder protection treats the shareholder distribution as independent of what the 
company actually does.  In Miller-Modigliani terms, the distribution of shareholdings is 
irrelevant to the company’s actual activities.  Just as the division of capital between debt 
and equity on the right side of the balance sheet does not, under the irrelevancy 
propositions, affect the value of real assets on the left side of the balance sheet,6 the line 
that separates the two sides of the balance sheet also isolates the distribution of equity 
among shareholders from the value of the corporation’s assets.  My hypothesis is that bad 
commercial law, as opposed to just poor minority shareholder protection as contemplated 
by the Law and Finance literature, breaks down the separation between equity 
distribution and firm value.  I posit that that the presence of a controlling shareholder and, 
in particular, a family controlling shareholder, allows the corporation to better conduct its 
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4business, but in a way quite different than the potential for a controlling shareholder to 
more effectively police the agency conflict between management and shareholders, the 
productive advantage typically ascribed to a controlling shareholder structure.7
Broadening the concept of “bad law” to take into account not only the quality of 
minority shareholder protection, but also the quality of commercial law more generally, 
frames the problem.  In an environment of bad commercial law, a corporation’s basic 
business depends on its capacity to engage in self-enforcing exchange – that is, 
commercial transactions where the parties perform their contractual obligations because it 
is in their self-interest to perform, not because of the threat of legal sanction.  With bad 
commercial law, exchange must be self enforcing because there are neither authoritative 
rules, nor an effective judicial system to enforce those obligations.8 Transactions in this 
circumstance take place in a reputation market, which substitutes for law (or its shadow) 
as a means to assure that parties perform their contractual obligations. 
 Framing the problem as one of commercial contracting in a bad law environment 
suggests a very different function for shareholder distribution than contemplated by the 
Law and Finance literature.  When commerce must take place in a reputation market, in 
which a corporation’s business must be effected through self-enforcing transactions, the 
distribution of shareholdings, and particularly the presence of family ownership, facilitate 
the development and maintenance of the reputation necessary for a corporation’s 
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5commercial success.9 More speculatively, the role of reputation in the product market 
may help explain why we observe publicly held minority shares in the capital market 
even though poor shareholder protection does not impose a formal limit on the amount of 
private benefits that a controlling shareholder can extract.  If bad behavior toward 
minority shareholders can affect the corporation’s reputation in the product market as 
well as the capital market, then self-imposed limits on controlling shareholders’ 
extraction of private benefits may derive from their concern over success in the product 
market.  Indeed, the corporation may have minority shareholders at all, despite the high 
price of equity capital in the face of poor minority protection, as a kind of hostage to 
support its reputation in the product market.   
My ambition here is to offer a working hypothesis, an account neither formal in 
method, nor deeply grounded in the history and structure of particular jurisdictions.10 
What happens when we turn the capital market-oriented bad law account of concentrated 
ownership on its head, and focus instead on how product market-oriented bad law 
influences the distribution of equity?  The value of so a minimalist an approach lies in 
framing the issue clean of the complications inevitably associated with particular 
jurisdictions, with the hope that, if the account proves intriguing, it then will be of 
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6assistance in the real task – that of understanding the development of particular national 
markets, and one of the foundations of economic development more generally. 
Part I sets out the basic problem of commercial exchange in a jurisdiction without 
effective commercial law.  Part II develops how conducting business through a 
corporation can facilitate reputation formation and maintenance.  Part III examines how 
family ownership can improve a corporation’s capacity to act as a reputation bearer in the 
product market.  Part IV then speculates on why a controlling family shareholder might 
voluntarily limit the amount of private benefit extraction from minority shareholders not 
because its treatment of minority shareholders affects its ability to raise additional equity 
capital, but because bad behavior will degrade its reputation in the product market.  Part 
V addresses a final speculation, now about the dynamic character of controlling 
shareholder systems in developing countries.  The role of shareholder distribution 
described here is one that supports reputation-based product markets.  Such markets are 
limited in scale so that further economic development requires a transition to institutions 
that support anonymous product markets – a rule of law-based commercial system with 
effective formal enforcement.  The transition, however, will be impeded both by the 
particular characteristics of existing institutions – what Paul Milgrom and John Roberts 
call “supermodularity11 – and by the political influence of those who have large 
investments that are specific to a reputation-based product market.  Part VI concludes by 
framing the question with which we are left: how does the necessary transition take place 
in the face of structural and political barriers?12 More specifically, does the answer relate 
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7to the recent historical pattern of economically benevolent dictators observed during the 
transition period in many countries that have successfully developed? 
I.  The Structure of Reputation Markets 
In its most simple form, a self-enforcing commercial arrangement can be based 
only on the expectation of a long horizon of future transactions.  Where two parties  
expect to engage in repeated transactions, neither will have an incentive to misbehave in 
a particular transaction because bad behavior by one party in a transaction will be 
punished by the counterparty, whether by retaliating in future transactions, changing the 
terms of future transactions or refusing to engage in future transactions at all.13 This 
simple reciprocity model has significant limitations.  First, it requires the expectation of a 
lengthy relationship to avoid the incentive to cheat.  In the absence of future dealings, one 
party has no reason not to cheat on the current exchange.  And even the expectation of 
future rounds may be insufficient to assure self-enforcement if the number of rounds and 
their present value is small compared to the payoffs from cheating.14 Second, and for my 
purpose more important, the requirement of long lasting bilateral exchange to support a 
self enforcing transaction severely limits the size of the economy.  Individuals are limited 
in the number of long term trading partners they can support. 
 To increase the number of parties with whom one can trade requires adding the 
concept of reputation.  If one party will trade with others in the future, but may not trade 
with any single party repeatedly – that is, if trade will be multilateral rather than bilateral 
– self enforcement still will work if the party’s behavior in one exchange becomes known 
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8to future counterparties.  In other words, to support multilateral exchange the party must 
become known beyond its current trading partners – it must develop a reputation.  
 Self enforcing commercial exchanges when individual parties do not necessarily 
expect to transact with each other in the future – reputation-based markets – require a 
number of supporting factors.  First, parties must expect to engage in similar transactions 
in the future, even if not with the same trading partner; this creates the potential for 
punishing bad behavior.  Second, performance or breach must be observable, in the sense 
that there is a shared understanding among potential future trading partners of what 
constitutes good or bad behavior.  Third, a party’s behavior in one exchange also must be 
observable in a different sense; the party’s actual performance – whether the party 
behaved badly or whether it performed as anticipated – must be observable by potential 
future trading partners.15 
These factors have implications that limit the kind of market that can be supported 
by reputation-based exchange, all of which will restrict the level of commercial activity 
in that market.  Professor Avinash Dixit, in his model of relation-based exchange, uses 
the concept of “distance” to express the limiting impact of these factors.16 The choice of 
the term invokes the language of physical distance as a metaphor for the investment in 
information necessary to establish and maintain a reputation for contractual performance.  
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Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 Stan. L.Rev. 
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9Physical distance makes information costly to transmit in the absence of advanced 
technology.   
Similarly, both a shared understanding of what constitutes performance and the 
observability of breach depend, in the end, on the cost of information transmission.  The 
common values that underlay a shared understanding of performance under differing 
circumstances must be transmitted among future trading partners; as conditions change 
and values evolve, new information must be transmitted.  Communicating this 
information is a function of distance: it is more costly and less successful to communicate 
both with traders who are physically distant from the core of market participants, and 
with traders who are socially distant from the core, whether by culture, language or 
class.17 
Correspondingly, it is more costly to communicate the necessary information to 
sustain reputation-based transactions that are new or complicated: the concept of 
performance that must be shared requires more information and more new information, 
and lacks the shared understandings that define adequate performance in the traditional 
markets.  The result is straightforward.  “[C]heating becomes more attractive the more 
distant the partner.”18 
The scope and scale of a reputation-supported market is thus defined by a tradeoff 
between the gains from trading with more distant partners, who may offer different skills 
and goods and at least additional volume, and the increased costs associated with 
transmitting information to them.  These costs increase in the distance to the marginal 
 
17 “Cultural beliefs and behavioral norms coordinate expectations and provide a shared understanding of the 
meaning of various actions.”   Avner Grief, Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and 
Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange, in Handbook of New Institutional Economics 727, 762 (C. 
Menard & M. Shirley, eds., 2005). 
18 Dixit, supra note 13, at 68. 
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trader, while the accuracy of a trader’s reputation decreases in that distance.  The 
implication is that the size of the market depends on information technology: the better 
the technology, the lower the cost of transmitting shared values and performance 
information and, therefore, the less distant potential trading partners are from each other 
and the larger the size of the market that can be supported by reputation.  This 
relationship between information costs and the size and diversity of a reputation-based 
market creates the role for corporations to reduce the costs of establishing and sustaining 
such a market.19 
II.  Corporations as  Long-Lived Repositories of Reputation 
 David Kreps, in a well known essay on the economics of corporate culture, argues 
that a corporation can play a special role in a reputation-based market because of its 
superior capacity to establish and maintain a reputation. 20 Recall that the stability of a 
reputation market depends on a party’s assessment that there will a sufficiently long 
series of transactions with an existing trading partner, or with future trading partners with 
access to the party’s prior performance, to prevent anticipation of a rollback cascade from 
subverting contractual performance in the first place.  As discussed in the previous Part, 
the length of anticipated dealings prevents an equilibrium of voluntary performance of 
 
19 This account assumes that misbehavior is punished only by individuals – the injured trading partner and 
those who learn of the misbehavior – who decline to trade with the misbehaving trader.  However, 
reputation markets can develop institutions that facilitate the market’s operation by collectivizing 
information acquisition and sharing, and expanding the breadth of responsive sanctions.  See Grief, supra 
note 16, at 733-34 (C. Menard & M. Shirley, eds., 2005)(discussing “[o]rganic, multilateral reputation 
institutions”); Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory 
of Private Ordering, 104 Col. L.Rev. 2328 (2004)(contrasting the circumstances that underlay  the choice of 
enforcing a contract through firms, courts, or private organizations).  Because of the path dependency of 
institutional characteristics in particular jurisdictions, an account of their development requires a rich 
historical context.  See, e.g., Grief, supra note 10 (reputation based contract enforcement among early 
Maghribi traders).  My argument does not depend on the simplified presentation in the text; however, its 
application to a particular country will require developing the context, including the institutional structure 
of the reputation market. 
20 David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Perspective on Positive Political Economy 
91 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds. 1990). 
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obligations from unraveling into cheating in the current round once it can be expected 
that there will be a final round in which it will be in a party’s interest to cheat.21 In 
contrast to individuals who die or retire, corporations have an infinite life; they will not 
necessarily have a final period that triggers a cascade into current non-performance.  As a 
result, corporations will invest more in establishing a reputation and be more diligent 
about protecting one.  As Kreps puts it, “The firm is a wholly intangible object in this 
theory – a reputation bearer.”22 
One additional step is necessary to enable the corporation to function as a long-
lived reputation bearer.  As a formal matter, a corporation is just a long-lived piece of 
paper on which appears the corporation’s charter.  The corporation’s decisions – in our 
context, to perform its contractual obligations or not – are made by individuals with finite 
professional lives.  It may be in the corporation’s interest – that is, in the interest of future 
owners of the corporation – for it to invest in establishing a reputation and then invest in 
sustaining it by performing its obligations to trading partners, because those investments 
will pay off over the corporation’s infinite life.  But the investment will not be made 
unless it is also to the advantage of the short-lived individuals who actually make the 
corporation’s decisions.  For example, if all profits are currently paid out and the decision 
makers have no way to benefit from the value of the corporation’s reputation when they 
retire, then the corporation, in effect, will have a final period determined not by the 
corporation’s infinite life, but by its current owners’ mortality. 
 
21 The unraveling reasoning is that a potential trading partner will also know that the party will not perform 
in the final round, so it will anticipate that behavior and not perform in the next-to-last round, which will be 
anticipated by the first party, and so on back to non-performance in the current round. 
22 Kreps, supra note 20, at 111. 
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Krep’s solution to the problem of causing short-lived individuals to think like a 
long-lived corporation is to allow the current generation of decision makers to sell their 
position (equity) to the next generation of decision makers.  By allowing the current 
generation to secure a payment based on the discounted value of future corporate 
earnings, they then have an incentive to value the corporation’s future dealings beyond 
the length of their own careers, and therefore to make efficient current investments in the 
corporation’s reputation, because what they will receive for their positions is a function 
of the value of the corporation’s future trading.23 
The value of a long-lived reputation bearer in a jurisdiction with bad commercial 
law now should be apparent.  Developing long-lived bearers of reputations as trading 
partners reduces the costs of building reputations – one reputation lasts a long time – and, 
by reducing the number of participants over time, reduces the costs a trading partner must 
incur to learn the reputation of potential trading partners.  The resulting reduction in 
information costs decreases the distance between traders and therefore increases the 
range of parties with whom any single trader can contract.  In turn, this increases the size, 
scale and diversity of the market that reputation-based trading can support and, in the 
end, increases productivity and economic growth. 
III.  The Family as a More Efficient Reputation Bearer 
 
In fact, the strategy of reducing information costs through trading partners 
organizing production in long-lived corporations, and thereby increasing the size and 
scale of reputation-supported product markets, is more complicated than the discussion 
 
23 Id. at 108-110.  Other techniques also can be used to bond future reputation, such as making observable 
investments in assets that will be valuable only if the corporation is successful.  See Klein & Leffler, supra 
note 8.  However, all strategies require confronting the time preferences of the corporation’s short-lived 
decision makers. 
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thus far has acknowledged.  As we saw in Part II., Kreps gives current corporate decision 
makers the incentive to invest in long-term reputation by organizing the corporation so 
that the decision makers can sell their stake in the corporation before retiring.  This 
eliminates the problem of the decision makers facing a final period even if the 
corporation does not.  But this temporal arbitrage does not quite work.   
In Kreps’ account, the arrangement that creates the incentive for the decision 
makers to cause the corporation to invest in reputation that will pay off after their careers 
end, and which makes that reputation credible to potential trading partners, is part of the 
corporation’s internal governance structure.  This structure is not readily observable by 
potential outside trading partners; the information costs of learning about the 
corporation’s internal characteristics, which are central to a trading partner relying on the 
corporation’s reputation, are very high.  At this point, poor shareholder protection law (in 
addition to poor commercial law) enters the analysis.  An effective corporate disclosure 
regime will require the corporation to make public the structure of its owners’ and 
managers’ incentives, thereby reducing the costs of acquiring this information not only 
by the capital market, but by potential trading partners as well.  Without the ready 
availability of such information, the corporation may not succeed as a long-lived 
reputation bearer because trading partners will have no credible reason to believe that the 
relevant reputation is that of the corporation rather than the short-lived decision maker. 
 Recent corporate governance debates demonstrate that the problem of high 
information costs concerning the incentives of corporate decision makers, and the 
difficulty of evaluating them even if disclosed, are hardly theoretical.  Not long ago, 
criticism of the U.S. corporate governance system claimed that the incentive structures of 
14
U.S. corporations resulted in myopic planning, with too high a discount rate being 
applied in the capital budgeting process.  German and Japanese corporations, in contrast, 
were said to be long-term oriented because their decision makers faced a different, more 
patient, incentive structure.  Not many years later, the direction of the debate had 
switched, with the U.S. system lauded as providing incentives to innovate that were not 
present in the more conservative German and Japanese governance systems.24 Even 
more recently, the argument has shifted again.  Executive compensation scandals, 
concerning both the absolute amounts paid and the integrity of the process by which 
stock options were granted, at least raise questions concerning the incentive structure that 
had been said to support innovation, as well as doubts concerning the observability of 
managerial incentives even in the United States, the jurisdiction with what is likely the 
best shareholder protection.25 
My point is not to extend this continually shifting debate, but only to note that it is 
very hard to get the corporation’s internal incentives right even when you are trying.26 
And the harder it is to get it right, the higher the information costs associated with an 
outside potential trading partner trying to assess whether the corporate decision makers 
have the right incentives to cause the corporation to make investments in its long term 
reputation for performing its contractual obligations with trading partners.  The harder it 
 
24 See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Substance, 49 
Am. J.Comp. L. 329 (2001)(describing debate’s evolution); Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and 
Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 327 (1996)(same). 
25 See, e.g., Reena Aggarwal, Isil Erel, Rene Stulz & Rohan Wiliamson, Do U.S. Firms Have the Best 
Corporate Governance?  A Cross-Country Examination of the Relation between Corporate Governance and 
Shareholder Wealth, working paper, December 2006, available at SSRN.com/abstract=954165 (cross-
national ranking of governance systems based on shareholder wealth effects). 
r26 Compare Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation (2004)(criticizing the design on U.S. executive compensation), with Kevin J. 
Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power versus the Perceived Cost of Stock 
Options, 69 U.Chi. L.Rev. 847 (2002)(rebutting criticism), and Bengt Holstrom, Pay without Performance 
and the Managerial Power Hypothsis, 30 J.Corp. L. 703 (2005))(assessing criticisms and defenses). 
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is to evaluate internal incentives, the more assessment of a particular company matters, 
and the more a particular trading partner has to know to assess the corporation’s 
reputation.  Of course, this company-specific information is costly, especially in a 
jurisdiction with weak shareholder protection, and the resulting impact on a reputation-
based commercial market should be clear.  The increased cost of assessing reputation 
increases the distance between potential traders, and reduces the size and scale of 
commercial activity that can be supported.  Krep’s conception of the corporation as a 
bearer of reputation thus in part founders on the barriers to transmitting the information 
on which the corporation’s reputation depends. 
 Here, finally, is where family ownership comes into the account.  When the 
corporation is owned by a family, the internal incentives become much more transparent.  
The problem with Kreps’ model is the need for an intergenerational transfer between the 
current and the next generation of corporate decision makers so that current decisions 
will take long-term reputation creation into account.  In turn, the transfer mechanism has 
to be observable to potential future traders, a communication process that can be expected 
to be costly when the mechanism and its underlying incentive structure has to be set out 
in an explicit contract.  In contrast, family ownership solves the intergenerational transfer 
process rather elegantly.  Because of intra-family inheritance and family ties, the current 
generation of decision makers, at least in functional family businesses, treats the next 
generation’s utility as the equivalent of their own, so there is no temporal distortion of 
incentives to invest in reputation. 
 The critical point is that family ownership substitutes for internal incentive and 
transfer mechanisms as an assurance of the corporation’s commitment to long-term 
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reputation, but with one important difference.  Family ownership is much more easily 
observed by potential trading partners; so long as cultural values concerning family 
support the belief that current decision makers are committed to inter-generational utility 
equivalence,27 information concerning the corporation’s commitment to contractual 
performance is cheaper to transmit. 
 By this point, it is apparent where the argument is going.  The combination of 
Kreps’ insight that, because of its infinite life, the corporation can be an effective bearer 
of a long-term reputation for contractual performance, with the fact that family ownership 
can be a low cost way of communicating to potential trading partners that the corporation 
values future trading, increases the size and scale of the reputation-based trading market.  
If the corporation is the bearer of reputation, family substitutes for internal contract as the 
corporation’s DNA.  In an environment of bad law – both commercial and shareholder 
protection – controlling family corporations will have an evolutionary advantage.28 
27 Cultural values concerning the importance of family and the tradeoff between intra-family loyalty and 
individual self interest will differ among countries.  See Gilson, supra note 1, at 1673(cultural value of 
family control in Asia). Once the commitment to maximizing family wealth, as opposed to that of 
individual family members, breaks down – whether through cultural change as a result of modernization or 
because of what I have called the “gravity of generations,” id. at 1668 – then inside conflict over 
distributional issues will result in decreased commitment to reputation and reduced productivity generally.  
This, in turn, will undermine the support family ownership provides to reputation-based product market 
exchanges.  Mueller and Warneryd argue that public ownership responds to such internal distributional 
competition by forcing inside managers to unite against the outside owners’ demand for resources.  While 
Mueller and Warneryd do not have family ownership in mind, the intuition seems applicable: dysfunctional 
family ownership leads to a public offering.  Their model, however, assumes that the public’s investors 
have the power through legal rules to assert themselves, a circumstance that is likely not present in 
developing countries.  Holger M. Muller & Karl Warneryd, Inside Versus Outside Ownership: A Political 
Theory of the Firm, 32 Rand J. Econ. 527 (2001). 
 For a striking example of the disintegration of intra-family loyalty within a very successful U.S. family 
controlled business, see Suzanna Andrews, Shattered Dynasty, Vanity Fair, May, 2003, p. 182 (internal 
conflicts within Pritzger family leads to breakup of family fortune). 
28 Steven Tadelis develops a model of reputation formation that, in contrast to Kreps’ focus on moral 
hazard (one party cheating in a future round), is based on adverse selection (future buyers are uncertain 
about whether future owners will be talented or trustworthy).  Steven Tadelis, What’s in a Name? 
Reputation as a Tradeable Asset, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 548 (1999).  Tadelis’ model assumes that shifts in 
ownership of a business are not observable by customers of the business – hence the adverse selection 
problem that drives the model.  Family ownership, by making ownership shifts to non-family transparent to 
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While it is beyond my ambition to fully explore the implications of this 
conclusion here, I will address one such implication to provide an example of what is 
possible.  It is commonplace in developing countries that family controlled companies are 
conglomerates, operating in a range of different industries that do not share production 
economies of any type, whether scale, scope or vertical integration.  The two most 
familiar explanations for conglomerate organization in this setting are financial.  First, in 
the absence of an efficient external capital market, an internal capital market in which 
project funding is determined not by the market, but by the corporation’s internal capital 
budgeting process, may well be more effective.  Of course, this explanation is consistent 
with the capital market-oriented bad law argument: poor shareholder protection means 
poor disclosure, which in turn means an informationally inefficient capital market.  Thus, 
a conglomerate serves to internalize the capital allocation process.29 Second, a 
controlling shareholder bears the cost of non-diversification, especially where a weak 
local capital market makes laying off risk costly.  A conglomerate strategy allows 
diversification at the company level, where it benefits the controlling shareholder. 30 
future clients, therefore reduces the barriers to the operation of a reputation market in an adverse selection 
driven model, just as it does in Kreps’ moral hazard approach.  To be fair, Tadelis does briefly consider the 
possibility that family ownership might address the adverse selection problem, but dismisses the fact of 
family ownership as providing too little information to support a separation between good and bad service 
providers: “Clearly, businesses that have signs claiming that they have owned by the same family for 75 
years convey little information about the quality of the current owner, let alone of the key employees.”  Id. 
at 560.  In settings where family ownership powerfully predicts individual family member preferences for 
business success, Tadelis dismisses the impact of family ownership too quickly.  His point might be better 
understood as a prediction of regression to the mean in talent as control shifts from the business’ founder to 
her heirs.  There is some empirical evidence that supports this inference.  See Gilson, supra note 1, at 1668-
69 (reviewing studies). 
29 See, e.g., Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets?  An 
Analysis of Diversified Business Groups, 55 J. Fin. 868 (2000)(explaining the advantages of an internal 
capital market in emerging market jurisdictions). 
30 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 332-57 
(2nd ed. 1995)(reviewing explanations for conglomerate acquisitions). 
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A third explanation for conglomerate organization in developing countries, 
building on the role of family ownership developed in this Part, is product market rather 
than capital market focused.  The conjecture is that family control combines with Kreps’ 
conception of the corporation as a reputation bearer to reduce the information costs 
associated with maintaining a reputation.  Because in a country with bad commercial law 
all transactions are reputation-based, investment in reputation produces an asset subject to 
both economies of scale and scope.  Once family ownership is established, the marginal 
cost of transmitting that fact, and thereby providing a foundation for reputation-based 
trading, is decreasing with scale.  And the same forces that create reputational scale 
economies within a single industry also create reputational scope economies across 
industries, because reputation for contractual performance need not be industry specific 
where the performance uncertainty is integrity not capacity.  To be sure, the cost of 
information transmission may be initially higher when the corporation enters a new 
industry, so that potential traders in that industry are at a greater functional distance from 
the corporation; nevertheless, family ownership remains a less costly fact to convey. 
IV.  Why Minority Shareholders? 
We now move to a more speculative but also more narrowly defined question of 
how the product market influences the distribution of shareholders in the capital market.  
The role of family ownership in supporting self-enforcing corporate commercial 
exchange explains family control of corporations in developing countries, but it does not 
itself explain public ownership of a minority stake in the family-controlled corporation, 
also a familiar element of shareholder distribution in developing countries.31 Thus far in 
 
31 A number of explanations have been advanced for why a controlling shareholder would want to establish 
public minority shareholders, whether in an initial public offering or in a spin out public sale of a minority 
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the analysis, the product market explanation for family ownership shares this gap with the 
Law and Finance explanation of concentrated ownership.  As discussed in the 
introduction, a bad shareholder protection explanation for the prevalence of controlling 
shareholders does not explain why we observe any minority shareholders.  If investors 
know that there is an effective upper bound on the amount of private benefits that a 
controlling shareholder can divert, then they will pay a fair price for the earnings that 
remain and earn a fair return on their investment even if the trading price for minority 
shares is significantly below that for controlling shares to reflect the diversion.  The 
problem is that the literature does not reveal the source of that upper bound.32 
One could imagine that the need for controlling shareholders to return to the 
capital market to raise equity in the future could support an upper bound – an expected 
decrease in the price paid in the next offering would decrease the incentive to divert 
following the first.  There is, however, reason to be skeptical of this explanation.  As a 
factual matter, such companies do not frequently return to the capital market for equity, 
sharing that characteristic with public corporations in developed countries.  The 
explanation may be simply a bad shareholder protection variant of a pecking order theory 
 
interest in a previously wholly owned subsidiary.  These include the evaluative information provided by the 
pricing of an efficient stock market and the availability of publicly traded shares as an incentive 
compensation vehicle.  See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 
152 U.Pa. L.Rev. 785, 791(2003)(summarizing benefits to controlling shareholder from having a publicly 
traded minority); Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, A Comparison of Equity Carve-outs and Seasoned 
Offerings: Share Price Effects and Corporate Restructuring, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 153, 182 (1986)(information 
affect of minority carve out).  Such information-based explanations, however, require an efficient stock 
market, a condition that is not consistent with poor shareholder protection law. 
32 Heitor Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, should Business Groups be Dismantled?  The Equilibrium Costs of  
Efficient Internal Capital Markets (working paper, July 2004, forthcoming Journal of Financial 
Economics), available at SSRN.com/abstract+732184, provide a good example.  In Almeida and 
Wolfeszon’s model, the extent to which the controlling shareholder can divert assets is expressed as the 
“pledgebility” parameter; the model then yields different results depending on the extent to which returns 
can be effectively committed to minority investors.  However, there is not discussion of the institutional 
structure that allows an effective commitment not to divert more than a particular value of the parameter.  
Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 J. Fin. Econ. 2 (2002), 
use a similar modeling technique to parametize the level of diversion. 
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of capital structure.33 This theory posits that a company’s choice of what securities to 
issue turns on the informational asymmetry between the company and prospective 
investors, and that the asymmetry is more significant the riskier the security.  As a result, 
a company will use retained earnings to finance its activities when it can, with debt the 
second choice (less risky than equity because debt has priority), and equity (whose value 
is dependent on the most risky part of the company’s future earnings) as the last resort. 
Because the difficulty of securing credible information about future corporate 
performance, which underlies valuation of an equity offering, is much greater in a bad 
shareholder protection jurisdiction, information asymmetry and equity’s place at the 
bottom of the pecking order is reinforced.  Thus, the cost difference between bank 
financing or internal financing on the one hand, and equity financing on the other, should 
be substantially greater than in a good shareholder protection jurisdiction.   
The need to return to the equity market is therefore not a likely source of an upper 
bound for controlling shareholder private benefit extraction in bad shareholder protection 
jurisdiction; cost considerations make equity capital an even less attractive source of 
financing in these jurisdictions than in those with good shareholder protection.  Indeed, it 
is a two-sided puzzle, with the possibility of a lemons’ market on both sides: why do 
companies choose to pay the very high price for equity given the bad shareholder 
protection discount and the availability of cheaper alternatives; and why do minority 
shareholders purchase any shares at all in the absence of an observable ceiling on private 
 
33 See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 490-
96 (8th ed. 2006); Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Jeffrey Jaffe, Corporate Finance 450-53 
(7th ed. 2005). 
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benefit extraction?  Without more, both issuers and investors should shun this segment of 
the capital market.34 
An attractively more straightforward, but still troublesomely vague source for a 
ceiling on private benefit extraction is the intuition that even in a bad shareholder 
protection jurisdiction, the courts or regulators (or someone in authority) will act if a 
controlling shareholder is too greedy or too blatant in his exploitation of the minority.  
Perhaps even other controlling shareholders will support action against behavior that, 
because of the extremity of its revealed avarice, calls attention to the more measured 
diversion of others, something of an honor among thieves argument (or, less 
judgmentally, a private ordering solution to enforcement).35 But here the problem is how 
the market knows what the self or collectively imposed ceiling is.  Even if the market is 
informationally efficient, in the sense that it is an unbiased estimate of the ceiling’s 
height, the estimate is likely to vary widely around the unobservable true value.  Because 
all companies with a controlling shareholder will present the risk of uncertainty in the 
height of the ceiling, which cannot be diversified away in the national market, the 
minority share discount will be driven even higher. 
 If instead we approach the problem of locating a ceiling on private benefit 
extraction from a product market perspective rather than a capital market perspective, an 
alternative explanation is possible, although it shares a troublesome vagueness with the 
unofficial ceiling on diversion explanation just considered.  In this product market- based 
explanation, minority shareholders may play an important reputation role in jurisdictions 
with both bad shareholder protection and bad commercial law.  As we saw in Part I, the 
 
34 Gilson, supra note 1, at 1674-78, addresses possible responses to these adverse selection problems. 
35 See Grief, supra note 17, at 732-35; Richman, supra note 19, at 2338-48. 
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cost of transmitting performance information is critical to the scale of the reputation-
based product market that can be supported.  Suppose that the treatment of minority 
shareholders is visible to a company’s potential trading partners at a low cost, perhaps 
because such exploitation is covered by the local newspapers.36 Fair treatment of 
minority shareholders then serves as evidence of the corporation’s integrity, including its 
commitment to performing its contractual obligations, a signal that is credible because it 
is costly – some extraction of private benefits of control must be given up.  If the family 
controlled corporation does not cheat in easy (because of poor shareholder protection) 
ways by exploiting minority shareholders, the reasoning goes, the controlling family 
shareholder also will not cheat its customers.37 
The decision to have minority shareholders then can be explained not by the need 
for capital at the time of the initial public offering or in the future, but as a way of 
developing reputation that will be valuable in the product market (and which may justify 
the higher cost of capital for a one time issuance of minority shares).  From this 
perspective, minority shareholders play the role of reputational canaries, whose value is 
that they help credibly convey to potential traders that the corporation is an honest trading 
partner.  The analysis is akin to Klein and Leffler’s argument that reputation for product 
quality is supported by sellers investing in long-lived assets unrelated to product quality 
 
36 See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 5, at 582-86(treating newspapers as a corporate governance constraint).    
Luca Enriques has pointed out that the role of the financial press may be limited to a handful of developed 
countries where there is a widespread confidence in the newspapers journalistic integrity.  Absent that 
confidence, they cannot play the contemplated “shaming” role.  Private correspondence with the author. 
37 I recognize that I am at this point glossing over a serious problem – why is a controlling shareholder’s 
treatment of  minority shareholders  more observable than the quality of the products or services it 
provides? Or setting the bar at a realistically lower level, is the controlling shareholder’s treatment of 
minority shareholders sufficiently observable that it adds something to the customer’s assessment of the 
corporation’s reputation based only on the products or services it provides?  I will return to this concern 
after describing the product market explanation for minority shareholders in family controlled corporations. 
TAN 37-38 infra. 
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(like expensive offices for public accounting firms) whose value drops sharply if the 
company fails as a result of providing poor quality goods or services.38 More generally, 
think of corporate investment in image advertising; its principal value is demonstrating 
something about corporate character, which is believed to influence potential customers’ 
assessment of the corporation’s product or service.  In our context, the investment (or 
image advertising) is foregoing poor treatment of minority shareholders, which requires 
having minority shareholders in the first place. 
 To be sure, this preliminary account of a product market-based role of minority 
shareholders is far from complete.  The most significant gap that remains is how potential 
trading partners know what the acceptable level of diversion is, so they can know when 
the canary is gasping.  In this respect, the account suffers from the same problem as does 
the explanation that there is an unofficial ceiling on diversion that is both observable by 
minority shareholders and observed by controlling shareholders.  As developed in Part I, 
any reputation-based account of exchange – here the account is cross-market with 
reputation in the capital market supporting exchange in the product market – requires a 
shared understanding of what constitutes appropriate performance, now with respect to 
treatment of minority shareholders. 
While it is beyond my ambition here to fully develop the product market-based 
account, the shape of a hypothesis does take form.  The gap in an informal ceiling on 
diversion explanation for the presence of minority shareholders is that one still is left 
without an explanation for why one wants minority shareholders in the first place given 
less costly alternatives of bank financing or internally generated funds.  The product 
market-based account provides an answer to why the family corporation might want 
 
38 Klein & Leffler, supra note 8. 
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minority shareholders – because of the impact of their treatment on the corporation’s 
reputation in the product market – but still requires a mechanism by which fair treatment 
is visible to the family corporation’s customers.  An important difference between the 
two accounts, however, is that the product market-based explanation of minority 
shareholders as a signal of commitment to contractual performance at least provides an 
enforcement mechanism.  In the product market account, mistreatment of minority 
shareholders will be punished in the product market.  In a setting in which the corporation 
need not return to the equity market, the informal enforcement explanation does not 
explain how mistreatment of minority shareholders in excess of the norm is punished at 
all; rather, like the economist’s joke about being stranded on a desert island, it simply 
assumes unspecified informal enforcement through an unidentified actor. 
Turning now to the observability problem with a product market-based 
explanation of minority shareholders, the product market account starts with two 
advantages.  First, the controlling family shareholder in the product market-based account 
has a clear incentive to make its treatment of minority shareholders observable to product 
market customers; without that disclosure, there is no reason to have the minority 
shareholders at all.  Second, the observability of minority shareholder treatment need not 
be perfect.  Rather, the signal of fair treatment of minority shareholders need only add 
information to the direct information the corporation’s customers receive concerning the 
quality of its contractual performance.  Here the point is not merely whether the product 
market-based explanation for the existence of minority shareholders is better than an 
informal enforcement explanation – even if better, both explanations could be wrong – 
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but whether, net of its cost, it adds anything to the operation of the product market’s 
direct transmission of information concerning product quality.  
There is good reason to think that the capital market signal of product quality sent 
by the treatment of minority shareholders adds to a customer’s information set 
concerning product quality.  Here the idea is that assessing product quality is difficult in a 
jurisdiction with poor commercial law.  The experience of an individual customer may be 
a noisy measure of overall producer quality, even to the particular customer – did the 
customer receive a bad lot or was the seller simply a poor producer? Given the barriers to 
actual observation in a jurisdiction with poor commercial law – for example, where 
techniques like warranties are not viable – room  exists for a signal of quality that 
supplements a customer’s direct observation.  Additionally, the minority shareholder 
signal may have a cost advantage over further direct observation of product quality. The 
minority shareholder signal is given by the family controlled corporation; additional 
direct information concerning product quality in a bad commercial law jurisdiction 
requires aggregation of information from many parties, the institutions for which may be 
expensive to create and which require significant collective action. 
This analysis still leaves a gap: how does the controlling family shareholder make 
its signal of fair treatment of the minority credible?  But this is an acceptable place to 
stop in describing what, in the end, is meant only to be a hypothesis.  Signals have to be 
understood in a context, and their development is dynamic: a signaler changes its signal 
as it better understands the recipients’ response.  For now, it is enough that a hypothesis 
of a product market-based explanation of the existence of minority shareholders in family 
controlled corporations is plausible.  It is more completely specified that an informal 
26
enforcement explanation and it need not be a better signal of quality than producers’ 
direct provision of information – it need only add to the total information the customer 
receives.  My claim is that the product market-based account is worth our thinking about. 
 Of course, a product market/reputation account  and an informal enforce ceiling 
are not are not mutually exclusive, nor are they the only approaches to explaining why 
family controlled companies in developing markets have minority shareholders.  Yet 
another account places the motive for the existence of minority shareholders in the realm 
of political economy.  In many emerging market countries, having a stock market is like 
having a national airline – a badge of modernity that does not demand an economic 
justification.  The government wants a stock market; the company goes along by issuing 
equity and paying the higher cost of capital – a tax of sorts – and the individual investors 
buy equity for the same reason that Americans buy state lottery tickets, or because few 
alternative investments are available.  This account also lacks a ceiling on private benefit 
extraction, but one can imagine that if the government wants to have a stock market, it 
may have the capacity to enforce, however informally, a particular ceiling.39 In any 
event, elements of a product market/reputation account, an informal ceiling account, and 
a vanity stock market account for minority shareholders all may be operative; and the 
relative importance of each may differ depending on the context of a particular national 
market.  The key is understanding the range of explanations that may be at work. 
V.  The Dynamics of Reputation-Based Exchange 
39 The enforcement of a Japanese main bank’s obligation to undertake a rescue of its clients has been said 
to operate in this informal way.  While a main bank had no formal legal obligation to undertake a rescue, 
the Ministry of Finance had to approve applications to open new bank branches, a decision that was left 
entirely in the Ministry of Finance’s discretion.  The failure to discharge the informal rescue obligation 
would be punished by the denial of branch applications.  See Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick & Paul Sheard, 
The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview, in The Japanese Main Bank System 3, 27-32 
(M. Aoki & H. Patrick eds., 1994). 
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This brings us to the final element of our assessment of family controlled 
corporations in developing markets.  To this point, the analysis has been largely static, 
with attention focused on the conditions necessary for reputationally-based self enforcing 
exchange, and the complementary shareholder distribution in jurisdictions with bad 
commercial law.  I want to close with a preliminary consideration of the dynamics of 
such markets, to the end of framing a central question about national economic 
development:  How does a nation make the leap from reputationally-based to anonymous, 
rule of law-based commercial relationships that is necessary to sustain economic growth? 
A reputation-based commercial system can grow quickly.40 However, such a 
system runs into an upper bound.  For example, the distance-limited size of the market 
for a particular product discussed in Part IV forces a corporation to expand into unrelated 
businesses to achieve economies of scale and scope associated with its reputation.  This 
strategy comes, however, with a cost:  production of unrelated products with which the 
corporation has no experience will be less efficient.  As with any expansion, decreasing 
returns on reputation will set in at the margin as sales extend to trading partners at a 
greater “distance.”  At the same time, marginal costs will increase with “distance” as a 
result of expanding into new geographical markets, and expanding into unrelated but 
geographically proximate businesses, both from lack of experience and from the 
difficulty of managing the growing number of different industries in which the now-
conglomerate corporation participates.  Because both the number of potential traders 
within a feasible reputation-distance from the corporation, and the number of industries 
in which the firm can successfully operate, have finite limits, sooner or later economic 
growth in reputation-based product markets slows down. 
 
40 See Dixit, supra note 13 at 82; Li, supra note 8. 
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At this point, the jurisdiction has to transform its commercial law to a system that 
provides effective formal enforcement of contractual obligations in order to extend the 
reach of its producers to buyers too distant to rely entirely on reputation-based self-
enforcement.41 However, this process is unlikely to be linear, and ultimately may not 
succeed.  As Dixit reasons, “[t]he fixed costs of rule-based governance are a public 
investment; therefore society must solve a collective action problem to put such a system 
in place.  This is not automatic; there are the usual problems of free-riding, 
underestimation of the benefits to future generations in today’s political process, and the 
veto power of those who stand to lose from the change.”42 The potential for those who 
have been most successful in the relation-based economy to resist transition to a rule of 
law-based system is a matter of particular concern.  Precisely those families who the 
existing relation-based system most advantages, and who therefore have the greatest 
system-specific investment in  reputation, have the most to lose from the reduction in 
entry barriers caused by a system transition to rule of law-based formal enforcement,43 
and who likely also have the most political influence.  As Mancur Olson has argued, 
these families will have both the incentive and the resources to make more difficult, or to 
block, the development of new formal institutions that devalue the families’ investment 
in relation-supporting institutions.44 
41 Both Dixit, supra note 13, at 80-82, and Li, supra note 8, at 659-61, stress this point.  Douglass North has 
stated that “the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most 
important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.”  
North, supra note 14, at 54. 
42 Dixit, supra note 13, at 80. 
43 For example, in a system with good commercial law, contractual commitments like warranties can 
provide new entrants a substitute for difficult to acquire reputation.  When KIA, a Korean automobile 
manufacturer entered the U.S. market, it offered a substantially longer warranty than its established 
competitors. 
44 Mancur Olsen, The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982).  Almeida & Wolfezon, supra note __, make the 
same point about conglomerates in developing countries.  Once conglomerates become a large enough part 
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As a result, economic growth may falter or turn negative in this transition period, 
when existing relation-based institutions are becoming less efficient and their 
replacement by rule of law-based commercial institutions is not yet complete.  The same 
institutions that made the economy grow so quickly during its early development period 
then operate as a barrier to effective transition, a phenomenon that Paul Milgrom and 
John Roberts call “supermodularity.”45 As they put it, "(e)ven if a coordinate adjustment 
on all relevant dimensions might yield an improvement in performance, it may be that 
until all the features of the new pattern have been implemented, the performance of the 
system may be much worse than in the original position."46 Indeed, John Shuhe Li 
ascribes the shift between the “East Asian Miracle” and the “East Asian Financial Crisis” 
to just such a phenomenon: “The dismantling of too many existing relationship-specific 
mechanisms in so short a period can damage the future potential of economies at an early 
stage of development to catch up; i.e., before reaching the turning point where relation-
based governance is still more cost-effective than rule-based governance… .”47 
VI.  Conclusion: How is the Transition to Rule of Law Enforcement Accomplished? 
The function of shareholder distribution looks quite different when approached 
from the product market side than from the capital market side.  While the absence of 
effective minority shareholder protection may in some circumstances explain the absence 
 
of the economy, they may impose a negative externality by causing the overall capital market to operate 
inefficiently, even if the conglomerates’ internal capital markets operate efficiently as a result of a kind of 
crowding out phenomenon.  In this setting, government intervention may be necessary to reduce the 
conglomerates’ role 
45 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complimentarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic 
Organization, 1 Estudios Economicos 3, 12 (1994).  
46 Id. 
47 Li, supra note 8, at 669. 
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of corporations whose shares are widely held,48 it does not explain why we observe 
minority holdings at all, nor the special role of controlling family shareholders in many 
countries.  From the perspective of the product market, shareholder distribution, 
including family control, may play a role in the facilitating the corporation’s operation as 
a reputation bearer in markets where commercial exchange is supported by reputation 
rather than formal enforcement.   
A focus on shareholder distribution from a product market perspective also 
highlights the importance of a dynamic account of the institutions necessary for economic 
growth.  For developing economies, reputation-based markets can develop more easily 
and grow more quickly than markets that support anonymous trading, because the 
institutional structure of a system based on formal enforcement is both more expensive 
and more difficult to develop.  Formal enforcement requires the rule of law, and a well 
functioning government.49 
The problem is transition.  The institutions that supported relation-based 
exchange, and in which the families that have been most successful have large 
investments, ultimately become barriers to further development; a public choice analysis 
 
48 Recent scholarship suggests that in some countries causation may run in the opposite direction.  Julian 
Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time with Family: The Decline of Family 
Ownership in the UK, in The History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups 
to Professional Managers (Randall Morck ed. 2005), and Brian Cheffins, Brian R. Cheffins, Are Good 
Managers Required for a Separation of Ownership and Control?, 13 Indus. & Corp. Change 591 (2004), 
argue that U.K. shareholding patterns arose from informal relations of trust and confidence that encouraged 
equity investment by investors geographically proximate to the issuer.  Here the influence is from product 
market to capital market.  This diversity in actual history among jurisdictions is consistent with Avner 
Grief’s conclusion that the structure of reputation markets in individual countries will be path dependent.  
Because “cultural beliefs and behavioral norms will coordinate expectations and provide a shared 
understanding of the meaning of various actions.  Ceteris paribus, initial social structures and cultural 
features therefore influence which, among the many possible organic [reputation market structures] will 
emerge… .”  Grief, supra note 17, at 762.  See sources in note 24 supra  (discussing path dependency of 
corporate governance institutions). 
49 See Kenneth Damm, Legal Institutions, Legal Origins, and Governance, John M. Olin Law & Economics 
Working Paper Sieries, 2nd ed., No. 303 (September 2006), available at ssrn..com/abstract_id=932694 
(surveying literature). 
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suggests that those who have succeeded in a relation-based economy will resist the 
transition to formal enforcement.  The politics of transition then are driven by the size of 
one’s piece, rather than the size of the pie.  If this analysis is plausible, we are left with a 
task and a conjecture.  The task is to develop a dynamic account: what breaks the 
transition log jam – how does a country overcome the political barriers to shifting the 
character of its product markets by supplementing reputation with rule of law-based 
formal enforcement.50 The conjecture, which I am pursuing in work with Curtis 
Milhaupt, is that, in countries that in recent years have successfully made the switch, the 
architects of the institutional and market transition were what we term “economically 
benevolent dictators,” whose political power allowed the imposition of their individual 
utility function – continued economic growth even at the expense of (or by buying off) 
influential families51 If this conjecture turns out to explain some of the variance in 
development between different nations, the task is not to find more dictators – 
economically benevolent dictators, even if one could find them, have not been benevolent 
along other important dimensions – but instead to understand the function that they play 
and then to design less oppressive substitutes. 
 
50 Avner Grief and David Laitin provide an analytic road map for developing a dynamic account of system 
change, noting that a game theoretic account explains an equilibrium, not what causes a system to shift to a 
new equilibrium.  Avner Greif & David Laitin, A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change, 98 Am. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 633 (2004).  A shift resulting from changed external conditions is easy enough to explain – the 
rules of the game have changed.  The harder question is to explain how systems change as a result of 
internal forces.  Given the equilibrium analysis, “[e]ndongenous institutional change appears, then, to be a 
contradiction in terms.”  Id. at 633. 
51 Fareed Zakaria makes a related  claim whose point is to explain the development of democratic 
government rather than economic development.  He argues that the success of democracy is a function of 
per capita GDP.  In his view, the first step toward representative government is economic development, 
which may require a dictator, but which also then creates the middle class that will bring the dictator down.  
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom 69-73 (2004).  Played through Grief and Laitin’s model, supra note 
49, this would be an  example of an equilibrium whose circumstances undermine its stability. 
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